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Fraudulent Concealment, Self-Concealing Conspiracies, and 
the Oayton Act 
Richard F. Schwed 
INTRODUCTION 
Section 4B of the Clayton Act provides a four-year statute of limi-
tation for all civil antitrust actions brought under the Act. 1 The doc-
trine of fraudulent concealment, however, allows courts to toll this 
statute of limitation when the defendant conceals the acts giving rise 
to the cause of action. This doctrine prevents wrongdoers from un-
fairly using statutes of limitation to escape sanction. 
Although the judiciary originally created this exception for fraud 
actions, 2 the Supreme Court later expanded the doctrine to be "read 
into every federal statute of limitation."3 In antitrust cases, courts 
have required that the plaintiff plead and prove three elements in order 
to toll the statute of limitation: (1) the defendant concealed the con-
duct that constitutes the cause of action; (2) the defendant's conceal-
ment prevented the plaintiff from discovering the cause of action; and 
(3) the plaintiff exercised due diligence in attempting to discover the 
cause of action.4 Application of the first element, the concealment re-
quirement, has created uncertainty and division among the courts. 5 
Specifically, the courts disagree as to whether the plaintiff must show 
that the defendant concealed the wrong with affirmative acts beyond 
those necessary to create an antitrust violation, or whether it is suffi-
cient for the plaintiff to show that the defendant committed a "self-
concealing" wrong. 6 
1. Clayton Act § 4B, 15 U.S.C § 15b (1988). Section 4B states: "Any action to enforce any 
cause of action under sections 15, 15a or 15c of this title shall be forever barred unless com-
menced within four years after the cause of action accrued." Section 15 provides a private civil 
cause of action for violations of all federal antitrust laws; section 15a provides the federal govern-
ment with a civil cause of action; and section 15c provides state attorneys general with a civil 
cause of action. 
Although a part of the Clayton Act, the four-year statute of limitation governs violations of 
all "antitrust laws," which include the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1988), the Sherman Act, 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988), and the Wilson Tariff Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-11 (1988); see also Nashville 
Milk Co. v. Carnation Co., 355 U.S. 373, 375-76 (1958); PHILLIP AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALY-
SIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES, § 159, at 75 n.82 (3d ed. 1981). 
2. Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 349-50 (1875). 
3. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946). 
4. See, e.g., Pinney Dock & Transp. Co. v. Pennsylvania Cent. Corp., 838 F.2d 1445 (6th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 880 (1988); Guido Saveri & Lisa Saveri, Pleading Fraudulent Con-
cealment in an Antitrust Price Fixing Case: Rule 9(b) v. Rule 8, 17 U.S.F. L. REV. 631, 635, 637 
(1983). 
5. See infra section l.C. 
6. See infra section I.C. 
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This Note argues that courts should apply a self-concealment stan-
dard to section 4B of the Clayton Act rather than require a showing of 
additional affirmative acts. Part I examines the history of the fraudu-
lent concealment doctrine and its application to antitrust cases. It 
identifies three different standards used by courts to satisfy the con-
cealment element and finds that courts apply the doctrine inconsis-
tently. Part II analyzes the relationship between the fraudulent 
concealment doctrine and the self-concealment standard in antitrust 
cases by examining the judicial development of the doctrine and Con-
gress' intent in enacting section 4B. Part II concludes that the self-
concealment standard is an integral part of the fraudulent co.nceal-
ment doctrine and thus should apply to section 4B cases. Part III 
addresses the policies behind statutes of limitation generally and sec-
tion 4B specifically, and finds that the self-concealment standard best 
achieves these policy goals. This Note concludes that courts should 
toll the antitrust limitation period when the defendant either has af-
firmatively concealed his wrong or has committed a wrong that inher-
ently conceals itself. 
I. FRAUDULENT CONCEALMENT AND THE CLAYTON ACT 
This Part reviews the evolution of the fraudulent concealment doc-
trine, evaluates the courts' application of the doctrine to the antitrust 
laws, and examines the disagreement among the courts on how to ap-
ply the doctrine. Section I.A analyzes the history, language, and pur-
pose of section 4B of the Clayton Act. Section I.B traces the common 
law origins and development of the fraudulent concealment doctrine, 
discussing the key Supreme Court cases applying the doctrine over the 
past 120 years. Section l.C analyzes courts' recent application of the 
fraudulent concealment doctrine to section 4B actions. In particular, 
this section sets out three different standards that courts have used for 
the concealment requirement and discusses the confusion among the 
courts in choosing among these standards. This Part concludes that 
the current application of the fraudulent concealment standard in sec-
tion 4B cases creates uncertainty and confusion in the courts, thereby 
defeating the underlying goal of section 4B. 
A. Section 4B of the Clayton Act 
Prior to 1955, the Clayton Act did not include a statute of limita-
tion, and federal courts relied on state law to determine limitation pe-
riods for private antitrust actions brought under the Clayton Act. 7 
7. See Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906); S. REP. 
No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1955), reprinted in 1955 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2328, 2330 [hereinafter 
SENATE REPORT] ("While this is a federally accorded right of action, at the present time private 
treble·damages cases are governed by State statutes of limitation."); Note, Clayton Act Statute of 
Limitations and Tolling by Fraudulent Concealment, 72 YALE L.J. 600, 601 (1963) [hereinafter 
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Because limitation periods varied among the states, 8 plaintiffs engaged 
in forum shopping, creating uncerntjnty for potential defendants. 9 In 
addition, within a given state, parties were confused as to which stat-
ute of limitation applied to antitrust actions.10 To establish uniformity 
and eliminate "confusion and discrimination," 11 Congress added sec-
tion 4B to the Clayton Act in 1955.12 Section 4B states that "[a]ny 
action to enforce any cause of action under [the antitrust laws] shall be 
forever barred unless commenced within four years after the cause of 
action accrued."13 The statutory language includes no provision for 
extending the period.14 
Note, Tolling by Fraudulent Concealment] ("Prior to January 7, 1956 ... various state statutes 
were used to determine the applicable period of limitations."). 
8. Courts applied statutes of limitation ranging from one to twenty years. SENATE REPORT, 
supra note 7, at 2331. 
9. See id. at 2330-31 ("[A] plaintiff injured in severaljurisdictions is permitted to select as his 
forum the State with the most favorable statute. In such cases, the defendant remains in constant 
jeopardy until the longest period of limitations has transpired."); id. at 2333 Qetter from Attor-
ney General Herbert Brownell) ("Currently, private antitrust action is needlessly complicated 
. . . . [V]arying periods of limitation encourage 'forum shopping' and seem ill-suited for enforce-
ment of a uniform Federal policy."). 
10. Id. at 2331 ("Even when the State whose statute of limitations is applicable has finally 
been ascertained, there remains another hurdle to be overcome, namely the selection of the ap-
propriate law of the State . . . . [C]onfusion as to the correct limitation period abounds."). For 
an example of the confusion and uneven treatment of defendants before the enactment of section 
4B, see Winkler-Koch Engg. Co. v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 100 F. Supp. 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). 
In that case, which involved multiple defendants, the court applied a New York six-year limit to 
some claims, a New York three-year limit to others, a Kansas three-year limit to others, and a 
Kansas two-year limit to the rest. 100 F. Supp. at 27-28. 
11. SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 2331 ("It is one of the primary purposes of this bill to 
put an end to the confusion and discrimination present under existing law where local statutes of 
limitations are made applicable to rights granted under our Federal laws."). 
12. Clayton Act Amendments, ch. 283, § 1, 69 Stat. 283 (1955) (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. § 15b (1988)). 
13. 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1988). 
14. At the same time that Congress enacted section 4B of the Clayton Act, it also enacted 
section 5(i) (formerly section 5(b)), which provides a limited tolling mechanism for private causes 
of action when the government brings an antitrust action based on the same conduct. Clayton 
Act Amendments, ch. 283, § 2, 69 Stat. 283 (1955) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 16(i) 
(1988)). Section 5(i) provides: 
Whenever any civil or criminal proceeding is instituted by the United States to prevent, 
restrain, or punish violations of the antitrust laws, but not including an action under section 
15a of this title, the running of the statute of limitations in respect of every private or State 
right of action under said laws and based in whole or in part on any matter complained of in 
said proceeding shall be suspended during the pendency thereof and for one year thereafter: 
Provided, however, That whenever the running of the statute of limitations in respect of a 
cause of action arising under section 15 or 15c of this title is suspended hereunder, any 
action to enforce such cause of action shall be forever barred unless commenced either 
within the period of suspension or within four years after the cause of action accrued. 
15 U.S.C § 16(i) (1988). See Charles E. Stewart, The Government Suspension Provision of the 
Clayton Act's Statute of Limitations: For Whom Does It Toll?, 60 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 70 (1985) 
(discussing section 5(i)); Grant W. Wiprud, Antitrust Treble Damage Suits Against Electrical 
Manufacturers: The Statute of Limitations and Other Hurdles, 57 Nw. U. L. REV. 29, 41-47 
(1962) (same); Note, Tolling by Fraudulent Concealment, supra note 7, at 605 (same). 
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B. The Fraudulent Concealment Doctrine 
Even without any basis in statutory language, courts have long 
been willing to toll statutes of limitation. The doctrine of fraudulent 
concealment has its roots in the much-cited case of Bailey v. Glover. 15 
In Bailey, an assignee in bankruptcy filed a bill to set aside certain 
conveyances to Glover's relatives. 16 The applicable statute of limita-
tion under the Bankruptcy Act of 186717 provided that the assignee 
could not bring any action more than two years after the cause of 
action accrued. The Supreme Court tolled the statute of limitation 
because the defendant's concealment of the fraudulent conveyance 
prevented the plaintiff from discovering the injury creating the cause 
of action. 18 The Court stated: 
when there has been no negligence or !aches on the part of a plaintiff in 
coming to the knowledge of the fraud which is the foundation of the suit, 
and when the fraud has been concealed, or is of such character as to 
conceal itself, the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discov-
ered by, or becomes known to, the party suing .... 19 
Courts have relied on this statement as the basis for the modem fraud-
ulent concealment doctrine.20 While the fraudulent concealment doc-
trine has grown in importance since Bailey, neither the Supreme Court 
nor commentators have given it extensive attention.21 
In 1921, the Supreme Court extended the Bailey doctrine beyond 
the Bankruptcy Code. In Exploration Co. v. United States, 22 the gov-
ernment brought an action to cancel land patents, claiming that the 
defendant secretly and impermissibly obtained the contested patents. 
A six-year statute of limitation with no tolling provision appeared to 
bar the cause of action.23 The Supreme Court held, however, that the 
15. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342 (1875); see Andrew M. Horton, Note, Intent To Conceal: Tolling 
the Antitrost Statute of Limitations Under the Fraudulent Concealment Doctrine, 64 GEO. L.J, 
791, 797 (1983) ("Virtually all recent decisions and commentaries analyzing the history and 
applicability of the fraudulent concealment doctrine advert to Bailey v. Glover as the leading 
federal case on the doctrine.") (footnote omitted). 
16. Bailey, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 343. 
17. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, § 2, 14 Stat. 517 (currently codified as amended at 11 
U.S.C. § 108(a)-(b) (1988)). 
18. Bailey, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 349-50. 
19. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 349-50. 
20. John P. Dawson, Fraudulent Concealment and Statutes of Limitation, 31 MICH. L. REV. 
875 (1933); Saul B. Shapiro, Citizen Trost and Government Cover-up: Refining the Doctrine of 
Fraudulent Concealment, 95 YALE L.J. 1477, 1477 n.l (1986) ("Modern fraudulent concealment 
doctrine is usually traced back to Bailey v. Glover .... "). 
21. See Richard L. Marcus, Fraudulent Concealment in Federal Court: Toward a More Dis-
parate Standard?, 71 GEO. L.J. 829, 833 (1983). 
22. 247 U.S. 435 (1918). 
23. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 559, § 8, 26 Stat. 1093 (1891) (currently codified at 43 U.S.C. 
§ 1166 (1988)). 
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fraudulent concealment doctrine tolled the statutory limitation.24 
Although the statute did not expressly provide for tolling, the Bailey 
doctrine was well settled at the time the statute was enacted, and the 
Court thus presumed it was part of the statute. 25 
Although the Supreme Court explicitly expanded the Bailey doc-
trine beyond the Bankruptcy Act in Exploration Co., the Court failed 
to define the scope of the doctrine.26 Twenty-five years later, the 
Supreme Court addressed this issue in Holmberg v. Armbrecht. 27 
Armbrecht involved a suit in equity to enforce the Federal Farm Loan 
Act28 against the shareholders of a joint stock land bank. The Court, 
without dissent, 29 tolled the relevant limitation period and stated in 
dictum that the fraudulent concealment doctrine "is read into every 
federal statute of limitation."30 In the forty-seven years since Arm-
brecht, the Court has left it to the lower courts to determine how to 
read the doctrine into section 4B of the Clayton Act. 
C. Fraudulent Concealment Applied to Section 4B of the 
Clayton Act 
Despite the language in Armbrecht, defendants in early section 4B 
cases often contested the application of the fraudulent concealment 
doctrine to the Clayton Act.31 Although several district courts re-
fused to apply the doctrine at first, 32 it is now well settled that courts 
may use the fraudulent concealment doctrine to toll the Clayton Act's 
24. Exploration Co., 247 U.S. at 449; see also Marcus, supra note 21, at 840 (noting that the 
Supreme Court "had no trouble" applying the fraudulent concealment doctrine). 
25. 247 U.S. at 449. 
26. See Marcus, supra note 21, at 840 ("There remained, however, the question whether 
Bailey v. Glover should apply to the multitude of federal statutes that did not specify limitations 
periods."); Note, Fraudulent Concealment as Tolling the Antitrust Statute of Limitations, 36 
FORDHAM L. REv. 328, 329 (1967) [hereinafter Note, Tolling the Antitrust Statute] ("[After 
Exploration Co.] for many years it was argued that the fraudulent concealment doctrine applied 
only to actions grounded in fraud."). 
27. 327 U.S. 392 (1946). 
28. Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916, ch. 245, § 16, 39 Stat. 360, 374-75, repealed by Farm 
Credit Act of 1971, § 5.26(a), 85 Stat. 583, 624-24. 
29. Justice Jackson took no part in the decision and Justice Rutledge concurred in a brief 
opinion. Ambrecht, 327 U.S. at 398 (Rutledge, J., concurring). 
30. 327 U.S. at 397. 
31. E.g., Public Serv. Co. v. Allen-Bradley Co., 1962 Trade Cases (CCH) 70,549 (D. Colo. 
1962) (mem.) (rejecting defendant's argument that the unambiguous language of section 4B cre-
ated an absolute tolling provision); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 210 
F. Supp. 557 (N.D. Ill. 1962) (same) ajfd., 315 F.2d 558 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 834 
(1963); United States v. General Elec. Co., 209 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (same). 
32. E.g., Brigham City Corp. v. General Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 574, 577 (D. Utah 1962) 
(refusing to toll the section 4B limitation based on "mere dicta" of Holmberg v. Armbrecht), 
revd., 315 F.2d 306 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 374 U.S. 809 (1963); Kansas City v. Federal Pac. 
Elec. Co., 210 F. Supp. 545, 549-50 (W.D. Mo. 1962) (holding, with reservation, that Congress 
did not intend to allow tolling of section 4B by fraudulent concealment), revd., 310 F.2d 271 (8th 
Cir. 1962), cert denied, 371 U.S. 912 (1962), and cert denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1963). 
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limitation period.33 In order to toll section 4B, a plaintiff must plead 
and prove the three elements common to all fraudulent concealment 
claims. 34 , However, courts disagree as to what actions satisfy the re-
quirement that defendants "conceal" the conduct constituting the 
cause of action. 35 
In considering the concealment element, courts have identified two 
types of concealment: (a) concealment by affirmative acts; and (b) 
self-concealment.36 The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit pro-
33. Every federal circuit court that has considered the issue has held that the fraudulent 
concealment doctrine can be used to toll the section 4B limitation period. See, e.g., Texas v. 
Allan Constr. Co., 851 F.2d 1526 (5th Cir. 1988); Colorado v. Western Paving Constr. Co., 841 
F.2d 1025 (10th Cir. 1988) (per curiam, en bane), affg. 630 F. Supp. 206 (D. Colo. 1986), cert. 
denied, 488 U.S. 470 (1988); New York v. Hendrickson Bros., Inc., 840 F.2d 1065 (2d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 488 U.S. 848 (1988); Pinney Dock & Transp. Co. v. Pennsylvania Cent. Corp., 838 F.2d 
1445 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 880 (1988); Berkson v. Del Monte Corp., 743 F.2d 53 (1st 
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1056 (1985); Weinberger v. Retail Credit Co., 498 F.2d 552 (4th 
Cir. 1974); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. City of Burlington, 326 F.2d 691 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (per 
curiam); Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 315 F.2d 558 (7th Cir. 1963); 
Kansas City v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co. 310 F.2d 271 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 912 (1962), 
and cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1963); see Marcus, supra note 21, at 831 n.7 ("'The cases that 
have applied this [tolling] principle to antitrust cases ... are too numerous to require citation.' ") 
(quoting Norton-Children's Hosps., Inc. v. James E. Smith & Sons, Inc., 658 F.2d 440, 445 (6th 
Cir. 1981)). The doctrine has been applied broadly outside the antitrust arena as well. See Note, 
Tolling by Fraudulent Concealment, supra note 7, at 601 ("The doctrine applies, however, to all 
claims, regardless of their nature, as long as the requisite element of concealment is present."). 
A few commentators, however, have suggested that courts should not apply the doctrine to 
toll section 4B because the doctrine creates confusion and is inconsistent with the language and 
legislative history of section 4B. Francis R. Kirkham, Problems of Complex Civil Litigation, 83 
F.R.D. 497, 508-12 (1979); W. Glenn Opel, Note, A Reevaluation of Fraudulent Concealment 
and Section 4B of the Clayton Act, 68 TEXAS L. REv. 649 (1990). This view, however, has 
received no judicial or legislative support. 
34. The three elements are: (1) the defendant wrongfully concealed the conduct that consti-
tutes the cause of action; (2) the defendant's concealment prevented the plaintiff from discovering 
the cause of action; and (3) the plaintiff exercised due diligence in attempting to discover the 
cause of action. See, e.g., Pinney Dock & Transp. Co. v. Pennsylvania Cent. Corp., 838 F.2d 
1445 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 880 (1988); Saveri & Saveri, supra note 4, at 635, 637. 
Many courts set out the test to include only two elements, implicitly eliminating the second 
element. See Allan Constr., 851 F.2d at 1528 ("[S]econd, 'that [the plaintiff] failed, despite the 
exercise of due diligence on his part, to discover the facts that form the basis of his claim.' ") 
(quoting In re Beeflndus. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148, 1169 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 
U.S. 905 (1980)). There is no practical difference between the two formulations, however, be· 
cause this formulation merely combines the second and third elements into a single one. 
35. See Saveri & Saveri, supra note 4, at 637-38. Compare Allan Constr., 851 F.2d at 1528-31 
(requiring affirmative acts of concealment to satisfy the concealment requirement in bid-rigging 
case) with Hendrickson Bros., 840 F.2d at 1083-85 (allowing either self-concealment or affirma· 
tive acts of concealment to satisfy the concealment element). 
The courts also have disagreed over the application of the third element. Compare Hobson v. 
Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985) (holding that once the 
first two elements are proven, the defendant has the burden of proving that the plaintiff failed to 
exercise due diligence) with Allan Constr., 851 F.2d at 1533 (holding that plaintiff has the burden 
of proving all three elements). This issue is beyond the scope of this Note, however. For a 
discussion of this dispute, see Marcus, supra note 21, at 874-901. 
36. See Allan Constr., 851 F.2d at 1528-33 (discussing the two standards and requiring af-
firmative acts of concealment); Hendrickson Bros., 840 F.2d at 1083-85 (discussing the two stan-
dards and allowing tolling for either self-concealment or affirmative acts of concealment); Note, 
Tolling the Antitrust Statute, supra note 26, at 331. The Supreme Court noted the existence of 
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vided an example to illustrate the difference between these two means 
of concealment: The theft of an antique vase from its owner's house 
contains no element of concealment; the thief does not conceal the 
crime even though the thief is likely to attempt to conceal his involve-
ment in the crime. If the thief steals the antique vase and replaces it 
with a worthless copy, the thief has taken an affirmative act to conceal 
the fact that a crime was committed. The wrong is the theft of the 
vase; the replacement is an act of concealment that is separate from 
the crime itself since it is not a necessary element of the wrong. On 
the other hand, if the thief sells an imitation antique vase as a real 
vase, the thief commits a self-concealing wrong. The thief in this case 
does not intend merely to hide the wrong; rather, concealment is an 
essential element of the wrong - without it there can be no crime. 37 
In Bailey v. Glover, the Supreme Court held that either conceal-
ment by affirmative acts or self-concealment could toll the statute of 
limitation. 38 However, because Bailey involved an underlying action 
for fraud, some courts have hesitated to apply the holding in the non-
fraud context of the antitrust laws. As a result, federal courts have 
applied three different standards39 to satisfy the concealment element 
of the fraudulent concealment doctrine: (1) the separate-and-apart 
standard;40 (2) the self-concealment standard;41 and (3) the affirmative 
acts standard. 42 
Illegal bid rigging, a violation of the federal antitrust laws' prohibi-
tion on price fixing, provides a good example of how the three stan-
dards differ. Bid rigging can arise when one party, often a state or 
local agency, solicits competitive bids for a project.43 Absent a bid-
rigging scheme, each potential supplier interested in.the job will inde-
pendently submit a bid based on the supplier's expected costs and 
profit margin. If the party seeking the bid receives an adequate 
two types of concealment in Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 349 (1875) ("when the 
fraud has been concealed, or is of such character as to conceal itselP'). 
37. Wilson, 737 F.2d at 33 n.102. 
38. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 349-50; see Note, Tolling the Antitrost Statute, supra note 26, at 331 
("The Bailey case suggested that tolling can result from either an affirmative effort to maintain 
secrecy or from conduct which is insusceptible of discovery and which the defendant may have 
taken no particular steps to conceal."). 
39. Courts applying the fraudulent concealment doctrine do not necessarily identify the stan-
dards by the names that this Note uses. This Note adopts the terminology used by Opel, supra 
note 33, at 654. 
40. See infra section I.C.1. 
41. See infra section I.C.2. 
42. See infra section l.C.3. 
43. See Texas v. Allan Constr. Co., 851 F.2d 1526, 1530 (5th Cir. 1988) (involving a state 
agency seeking bids for highway construction project); Note, The Admissibility and Scope of 
Guilty Pleas in Antitrust Treble Damage Actions, 71 YALE L.J .. 684, 692-93 (1962) [hereinafter 
Note, Admissibility of Guilty Pleas] (discussing bid-rigging cases in which federal agencies, state 
agencies, local agencies, and electric utility companies sought bids). 
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number of bids, it then can choose the best offer, secure that it has 
received a competitive price. 
When suppliers form a bid-rigging conspiracy, however, they do 
not submit competitive bids. Rather, the potential bidders predeter-
mine which supplier will win the bid.44 The "winner" submits an in-
flated bid, and the "losers" submit complementary bids that are higher 
than the winning bid. In addition, all bidders may have to submit 
affidavits stating that they did not collude when determining bids. The 
complementary bids and the noncollusion affidavits give the bidding 
the appearance of a regular, competitive bidding process. In a success-
ful scheme, the appearance of regularity conceals the antitrust viola-
tion from the party seeking the bid. Whether a court will toll section 
4B because of this concealment depends largely on what concealment 
standard the court applies. 
1. The Separate-and-Apart Standard 
Courts that follow the separate-and-apart standard require the 
plaintiff to show that the defendant concealed the antitrust violation 
through affirmative acts committed wholly apart from the underlying 
illegal activity.45 To date, only the Tenth Circuit has adopted this 
standard. 46 In Colorado v. Western Paving Construction Co., the State 
of Colorado filed a civil suit alleging that the defendant conspired to 
rig bids on state highway projects.47 Because the alleged antitrust vio-
lations occurred thirteen years before the state filed suit, the state ar-
gued that the fraudulent concealment doctrine should toll the section 
4B statute of limitation.48 The state argued that the defendant con-
cealed the wrong by submitting a false affidavit denying its involve-
ment in collusive activities; the defendant had submitted a 
complementary bid to give the bidding an appearance of regularity 
and maintained a secret list of competitors in the conspiracy.49 
In considering whether the defendant's actions met the conceal-
ment requirement, the district court analyzed the history of the fraud-
ulent concealment doctrine beginning with Bailey v. Glover. The court 
interpreted Bailey as providing two different fraudulent concealment 
44. The conspirators can select the "winner" formally or informally. For example, in the 
electrical manufacturers' bid·rigging conspiracies prosecuted in the early 1960s, the conspirators 
rotated winners based on a predetermined division of the market among the competitors. See 
Note, Admissibility of Guilty Pleas, supra note 43, at 692 n.44. 
In a less formal arrangement, one bidder may ask competitors to allow him to win a given bid 
in exchange for the promise to do likewise in the future. See Colorado v. Western Paving Constr. 
Co., 833 F.2d 867, 870 (10th Cir. 1987), withdrawn, 841 F.2d 1025 (10th Cir.) (per curiam, en 
bane), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988). 
45. See, e.g., Western Paving, 841 F.2d 1025; see also Opel, supra note 33, at 654-56. 
46. Western Paving, 841F.2d1025. 
47. Colorado v. Western Paving Co., 630 F. Supp. 206 (D. Colo. 1986). 
48. Western Paving, 630 F. Supp. at 207-08. 
49. 630 F. Supp. at 210. 
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tests: one when the underlying cause of action was grounded in fraud 
and a separate test when the action was not grounded in fraud. 50 In 
actions based on fraud, the plaintiff must prove either that the plaintiff 
exercised due diligence in an attempt to discover the crime or that the 
defendant concealed the wrong. 51 Thus, if the plaintiff can prove due 
diligence, there is absolutely no concealment requirement. On the 
other hand, the district court held that in actions that are not 
grounded in fraud, including antitrust actions, the plaintiff must prove 
both due diligence and "affirmative acts of concealment."52 Conse-
quently, where there is a concealment requirement in nonfraud cases, 
the plaintiff only can meet it under this standard by showing affirma-
tive acts of concealment, not by showing that the defendant's actions 
were by their nature self-concealing. 
Applying the affirmative acts requirement to the facts of the case, 
the district court in Western Paving held that the defendant's acts did 
not constitute concealment. 53 The submission of complementary bids 
and the maintenance of confidential bid lists did not toll the statute of 
limitation because they were "acts taken in carrying out the conspir-
acy itself."54 Therefore, the court found that the plaintiff failed to 
meet its burden of proving affirmative acts separate-and-apart from 
the underlying wrong. 55 
Holding that bid-rigging schemes are per se self-concealing, a 
Tenth Circuit panel overturned the district court.56 However, upon 
rehearing, the Tenth Circuit sitting en bane vacated the panel opinion 
and affirmed the district court.57 Thus, in the Tenth Circuit, a plaintiff 
must demonstrate separate affirmative acts of concealment in order to 
toll section 4B. 
50. 630 F. Supp. at 208. 
51. 630 F. Supp. at 208. 
52. 630 F. Supp. at 208. 
53. 630 F. Supp. at 211. 
54. 630 F. Supp. at 210. The state also argued that the defendant affirmatively concealed the 
antitrust violation by submitting a false affidavit denying involvement in collusive activities. The 
court held that the plaintiff did not prove that it could impute the actions of the individual 
submitting the affidavit to the defendant corporation. However, the court went on to say that 
even if it had imputed the action to the defendant, the submission of such an affidavit would not 
have been an affirmative act of concealment under the separate-and-apart test. 630 F. Supp. at 
209-10. 
55. The court noted that the facts of Western Paving highlighted the importance of the sepa-
rate-and-apart standard since it was "a classic case in which the statute of limitations should be 
given effect" because the facts were so stale and much evidence had been lost. 630 F. Supp. at 
210-11. 
56. Colorado v. Western Paving Constr. Co., 833 F.2d 867, 881 (10th Cir. 1987) withdrawn, 
841 F.2d 1025 (10th Cir.) (per curiam, en bane), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988). 
57. Colorado v. Western Paving Constr. Co., 841F.2d1025 (10th Cir.) (per curiam, en bane) 
withdrawing 833 F.2d 867 (10th Cir. 1987), and affg. 630 F. Supp. 206 (D. Colo 1986), cert. 
denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988). 
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2. The Self-Concealment Standard 
The Second Circuit adopted the self-concealment standard in New 
York v. Hendrickson Brothers, Inc., 58 another highway construction 
bid-rigging case. The Second Circuit, relying largely on Bailey v. 
Glover, held that a "plaintiff may prove the concealment element by 
showing either that the defendant took affirmative steps to prevent the 
plaintiff's discovery of his claim or injury, or that the wrong itself was 
of such a nature as to be self-concealing. " 59 The court considered the 
self-concealment standard appropriate because the submission of false 
bids as real bids was analogous to the selling of a sham vase as a genu-
ine antique vase. 60 Turning to the facts of the case, the court held 
that, because "the defendants' scheme necessarily included conceal-
ment of the existence of their conspiracy, proof of the conspiracy itself 
sufficed to prove concealment by the coconspirators."61 Thus, in de-
termining that the defendant "concealed" the antitrust violation, the 
court did not find it necessary to identify specific acts of concealment; 
rather, the court held that the wrong, by its nature, concealed itself. 62 
3. The Affirmative Acts Standard 
Like the separate-and-apart standard, the affirmative acts standard 
requires that the plaintiff show affirmative acts of concealment. 63 
Under the affirmative acts standard, however, these acts of conceal-
ment may include acts committed as part of the conspiracy. Texas v. 
Allan Construction Co., 64 another highway construction bid-rigging 
case, highlights the difference between the two standards. In Allan 
Construction, the state attempted to toll the section 4B limitation pe-
riod because the defendants submitted false competitive bids and false 
affidavits claiming that their bids were valid. The state argued that 
these actions constituted inherently self-concealing acts, or, in the al-
ternative, were affirmative acts of concealment. The district court ap-
plied Western Paving's separate-and-apart standard and refused to toll 
the statute of limitation based solely on affirmative acts committed in 
58. 840 F.2d 1065 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 848 (1988). 
59. Hendrickson Bros., 840 F.2d at 1083 (emphasis added). This language highlights the fact 
that under the self-concealment standard the court will toll the statute of limitation if the plaintiff 
proves either that the defendant committed affirmative acts of concealment or that the wrong 
was self-concealing. 
60. 840 F.2d at 1083 (citing Hobson v. Wilson, 737 F.2d 1, 33 n.102 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. 
denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985)). See supra text accompanying note 37 for the general analogy of 
the theft of an antique vase. 
61. Hendrickson Bros., 840 F.2d at 1084. 
62. One court has interpreted the case to mean that "antitrust violations arising from a bid-
rigging conspiracy are always self-concealing." Texas v. Allan Constr. Co., 851 F.2d 1526, 1530 
(5th Cir. 1988) (discussing and refusing to follow the Second Circuit's position in Hendrickson 
Bros.). 
63. See Allan Constr., 851 F.2d at 1531; Opel, supra note 33, at 659. 
64. 851 F.2d 1526 (5th Cir. 1988). 
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furtherance of the conspiracy. 6s 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit first rejected the application of the 
self-concealment standard as inconsistent with Congress' intent in en-
acting the Clayton Act's four.:.year statute of limitation. 66 In doing so, 
however, the court did not explicitly reject the self-concealment stan-
dard for all section 4B cases; rather, it limited its discussion to bid 
rigging. 
The court then considered whether the defendants' actions repre-
sented affirmative acts of concealment. The Fifth Circuit explicitly re-
jected the Western Paving separate-and-apart approach and held that 
acts done in furtherance of the conspiracy also could constitute acts of 
concealment that toll the statute of limitation. 67 Applying this stan-
dard to the facts of the case, the court held that the submission of 
affidavits of denial could constitute affirmative acts of concealment. 68 
The court rejected the Western Paving test based on the underlying 
goal of the fraudulent concealment doctrine - to deny wrongdoers 
who have concealed their conduct the benefit of statutes of limita-
tion. 69 Therefore, "[t]he fact that such concealment occurs at the time 
of the wrong itself rather than afterwards does not make the wrong-
doer any more deserving of the statute's protection."70 Moreover, 
from an administrative point of view, the court saw no principled way 
to determine what acts were independent of the underlying wrong. 71 
The Sixth Circuit adopted the affirmative acts standard in Pinney 
Dock & Transportation Co. v. Pennsylvania Central Corp. 72 In Pinney 
Dock, the district court tolled the statute of limitation when it found 
that the defendant committed a self-concealing wrong. The Sixth Cir-
cuit reversed, holding that since "the underlying cause of action here 
is based upon alleged antitrust violations not fraud . . . a plaintiff 
should be required to prove affirmative acts of concealment, particu-
larly in light of the strong policy in favor of statutes of limitations."73 
Unlike the Fifth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit unequivocally rejected the 
application of the self-concealment standard in all antitrust actions, 
limiting it to actions grounded in fraud and breach of fiduciary duty. 
Thus, in the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, plaintiffs can meet the con-
cealment requirement by proving affirmative acts of concealment even 
if the defendant undertakes those acts in furtherance of the antitrust 
65. See Allan Constr., 851 F.2d at 1528. 
66. 851 F.2d at 1531. 
67. 851 F.2d at 1531. 
68. 851 F.2d at 1532. 
69. 851 F.2d at 1532. 
70. 851 F.2d at 1532. 
71. 851 F.2d at 1532. 
72. 838 F.2d 1445 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 880 (1988). 
73. 838 F.2d at 1472. 
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violation. In the Tenth Circuit, plaintiffs must prove affirmative acts 
of concealment that are separate and apart from the underlying viola-
tion. Finally, in the Second Circuit, plaintiffs may prove either affirm-
ative acts of concealment or that the defendant's wrong was inherently 
self-concealing. 
These different standards have produced confusion and inconsis-
tent results for similar claims. In Western Paving, the district court 
stated that affidavits of denial would not satisfy the concealment ele-
ment of the fraudulent concealment doctrine. 74 In contrast, virtually 
identical conduct satisfied the concealment requirement in Allan Con-
struction, in which the court allowed tolling for acts committed as part 
of the underlying wrong.75 Finally, in Hendrickson Bros., the court 
did not find it necessary to discuss any specific acts that the defendant 
committed and held that the inherently self-concealing nature of the 
conspiracy served to toll section 4B. 76 Thus, although section 4B 
would appear to provide a uniform four-year limitation period to all 
antitrust violations, the effective statute of limitation varies greatly. 
This result directly undermines Congress' explicit goals in adopting 
section 4B - to create uniformity and certainty and to discourage 
forum shopping. 77 
The courts can eliminate this confusion and inconsistency by 
adopting a single concealment standard for all section 4B actions. 
Part II of this Note concludes that only the self-concealment standard 
is consistent with fraudulent concealment jurisprudence and with 
Congress' intent in enacting section 4B. 
II. SELF-CONCEALMENT AND THE FRAUDULENT 
CONCEALMENT DOCTRINE 
To promote uniformity and certainty, courts should adopt a uni-
form standard for all section 4B fraudulent concealment cases. This 
Part argues that the self-concealment standard is an integral part of 
the fraudulent concealment doctrine, which Congress implicitly in-
cluded in section 4B. Section II.A examines the judicial creation and 
expansion of the fraudulent concealment doctrine and argues that the 
74. 630 F. Supp. 206, 209 (D. Colo. 1986), ajfd., 841 F.2d 1025 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 
U.S. 870 (1988) . 
75. 851 F.2d at 1532. 
76. New York v. Hendrickson Bros., 840 F.2d at 1085 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 848 
(1988). 
77. See Marcus, supra note 21, at 855 ("[T]he application of these superficially simple con-
cepts has left some courts groping with seemingly contradictory rules and empty concepts."); 
Stephen D. Susman, Prosecuting the Antitrust Class Action, 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 1513, 1520 
(1980) (noting problems with proof of fraudulent concealment in antitrust cases); Opel, supra 
note 33, at 650 ("The acceptance of the fraudulent concealment doctrine and its subsequent 
development in the courts has recreated much of the uncertainty and confusion that Congress 
sought to eliminate in 1955 [when it enacted section 4B]."); supra section I.A. 
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Supreme Court has implicitly incorporated the self-concealment stan-
dard into the fraudulent concealment doctrine. Section II.A con-
cludes by comparing the Clayton Act to the Racketeering Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and by noting that courts 
have uniformly applied the self-concealment standard under RICO. 
Section Il.B analyzes the legislative history of section 4B of the Clay-
ton Act and finds that Congress intended to allow courts to toll the 
limitation period for self-concealing conspiracies. This Part concludes 
that courts should find self-concealing conduct sufficient to toll section 
4B. 
A. From Bailey to Armbrecht: The Development of the Fraudulent 
Concealment Doctrine and the Self-Concealment Standard 
Courts should not separate the self-concealment standard from the 
fraudulent concealment doctrine and apply one without the other. 
When the Supreme Court set forth the fraudulent concealment doc-
trine in Bailey v. Glover, it outlined the self-concealment standard as 
well. 78 The Supreme Court paved the path from the Bankruptcy Act, 
tolled in Bailey, to section 4B in Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 19 in which 
the Court stated: "This equitable doctrine is read into every federal 
statute of limitation."80 
Today, courts still cite Bailey as the authoritative source of the 
fraudulent concealment doctrine, 81 and they cite Armbrecht as the ba-
78. 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 349-50 (1875); Marcus, supra note 21 at 866 ("[Bailey volun-
teered the idea] that concealment would not be required in nonfraud cases when the wrongdoing 
was 'of such a character as to conceal itself.' " (quoting Bailey, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 349-50); 
Opel, supra note 33, at 656 ("[f]he language of Bailey alone suggests that a plaintiff need not 
show affirmative acts if the defendant's wrong is self concealing."); Note, Tolling the Antitrust 
Statute, supra note 26, at 331 ("The Bailey case suggested that tolling can result from either an 
affirmative effort to maintain secrecy or from conduct which is insusceptible of discovery and 
which the defendant may have taken no particular steps to conceal."); Recent Cases, Antitrust: 
Clayton Act Statute of Limitations Tolled by Fraudulent Concealment Doctrine, 111 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1214, 1217 (1963) [hereinafter Recent Cases, Antitrust] ("[f]he doctrine requires proof ofa 
self-concealing conspiracy or of affirmative acts of concealment.''). 
79. 327 U.S. 392 (1946). 
80. 327 U.S. at 397; see also supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text (discussing 
Armbrecht). 
81. See, e.g., Texas v. Allan Constr. Co., 851 F.2d 1526, 1529 (5th Cir. 1988) (beginning its 
fraudulent concealment analysis with a discussion of Bailey); New York v. Hendrickson Bros., 
Inc., 840 F.2d 1065, 1083 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 848 (1988); Pinney Dock & 
Transp. Co. v. Pennsylvania Cent. Corp., 838 F.2d 1445, 1466 (6th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 488 
U.S. 880 {1988); Public Serv. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 315 F.2d 306, 309 (10th Cir.) (same), cert. 
denied, 374 U.S. 809 (1963); Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 312 F.2d 236, 239 (2d 
Cir. 1962) (en bane) (analyzing the "relevant decisions of the Supreme Court starting with Bailey 
v. Glover"), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 909 (1963); Kansas City, Mo. v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 310 
F.2d 271, 275 (8th Cir.) ("The landmark case on fraudulent concealment is Bailey v. Glover 
•.. .''), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 912 (1962), and cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1963); Horton, supra 
note 15, at 797 ("Virtually all recent decisions and commentaries analyzing the history and appli-
cability of the fraudulent concealment doctrine advert to Bailey v. Glover as the leading federal 
case on the doctrine.''); Case Note, Antitrust - Sherman Act Statute of Limitations Tolled by 
Fraudulent Concealment of Conspiracy, 31 FORDHAM L. REV. 812, 814 (1963) [hereinafter Case 
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sis for applying the Bailey doctrine to section 4B. 82 In applying the 
Bailey doctrine, though, many courts have split Bailey in half; they 
apply the fraudulent concealment aspect of Bailey to section 4B but 
limit the self-concealment aspect to actions grounded in fraud and 
breach of fiduciary duty. 83 Neither Bailey nor Armbrecht, however, 
provides an adequate basis for this distinction. 
Nothing in Bailey or Armbrecht implies that only the affirmative 
acts standard applies to nonfraud cases. Bailey in no way suggests any 
limitation on the scope of the self-concealment element; rather, Bailey 
treats the self-concealment and the affirmative acts aspects identi-
cally. 84 A court should limit the application of the Bailey doctrine -
by excluding the self-concealment standard - only if Armbrecht ex-
panded one half of the Bailey doctrine. The language of Armbrecht, 
however, directly contradicts such an interpretation. Armbrecht ex-
pands "[t]his equitable doctrine," which it had set forth in the preced-
ing sentence: 
And so this Court long ago adopted as its own the old chancery rule that 
where a plaintiff has been injured by fraud and "remains in ignorance of 
it without any fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of 
the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered, though 
there be no special circumstances or efforts on the part of any committing 
the fraud to conceal it from the knowledge of the other party. "85 
This sentence discusses the entire Bailey doctrine, including the ab-
sence of an affirmative acts requirement. The next sentence86 man-
dates that courts read the entire doctrine into every federal statute of 
limitation, including section 4B. 87 To limit the application of the self-
concealment standard to actions grounded in fraud lacks support in 
Supreme Court precedent; Armbrecht explicitly recognized its origin 
Note, Antitrust] ("The so called 'federal doctrine of fraudulent concealment' can be traced to 
Bailey .... "). 
82. The early cases applying the Bailey doctrine to section 4B all cited the key sentence in 
Annbrecht ("This equitable doctrine is read into every federal statute of limitation." 327 U.S. at 
397). See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 326 F.2d 575, 576 (9th Cir. 1964) 
(quoting "Justice Frankfurter's now-famous dictum" in Armbrecht); Public Serv. Co., 315 F.2d at 
310 (quoting Annbrecht); Atlantic City Elec. Co., 312 F.2d at 239 (same); Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 
310 F.2d at 276 (same); Case Note, Antitrust, supra note 81, at 816 (noting that Atlantic City 
Elec. Co., an early case applying the fraudulent concealment doctrine to section 4B, rested princi-
pally on a line of cases ending with Annbrecht). 
83. See, e.g., Pinney Dock & Transp. Co., 838 F.2d at 1471; see also Opel, supra note 33, at 
659 ("Courts that have accepted the affirmative acts standard follow the principle that the self-
concealing conspiracy standard applies only to claims based in fraud."). 
84. Bailey, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 348; Marcus, supra note 21, at 866 ("[Under Bailey,] con-
cealment would not be required in nonfraud cases when the wrongdoing was 'of such a character 
as to conceal itself.' ") (quoting Bailey, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 349-50). 
85. Annbrecht, 327 U.S. at 397 (quoting Bailey, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 348) (emphasis added). 
86. "This equitable doctrine is read into every federal statute oflimitation." 327 U.S. at 397. 
87. See Opel, supra note 33, at 657 ("In combination, Annbrecht and Bailey support a fraud-
ulent concealment standard that allows tolling for self-concealing wrongs regardless of whether 
the underlying claim is based in fraud."). 
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in fraud yet unequivocally extended it to all federal statutes of 
limitation. 
Some commentators and courts have argued, however, that this 
dictum in a forty-seven-year-old case does not justify the expansion of 
the self-concealment standard to section 4B. 88 Nevertheless, for thirty 
years, courts have relied on this Supreme Court dictum in applying the 
fraudulent concealment doctrine to antitrust actions. 89 As one court 
noted in applying the Armbrecht dictum to section 4B, "we must rec-
ognize the clear, direct, explicit, and unqualified statement of the 
Supreme Court."90 
Courts have also recognized the relationship between fraudulent 
concealment and the self-concealment standard outside the antitrust 
context. Cases arising under RIC091 provide a particularly apt anal-
ogy to the Clayton Act. Because Congress enacted RICO without a 
statute of limitation, the Supreme Court has held that the section 4B 
four-year limitation applies to civil RICO claims.92 The Court has 
thus applied the antitrust time limitation because the Clayton Act of-
fered the closest analogy to RIC0.93 
In 1989, the District of Columbia Circuit considered the relation-
ship between the fraudulent concealment doctrine and the RICO four-
year limitation period.94 Relying on Bailey and Armbrecht, the court 
88. See Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 312 F.2d 236, 242 (2d Cir. 1962) 
(Moore, J., dissenting) (criticizing courts' reliance on Armbrecht and Bailey in applying the 
fraudulent concealment doctrine to section 4B), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 909 (1963); Note, Tolling 
by Fraudulent Concealment, supra note 7, at 611 (criticizing reliance on this dictum as "a rather 
mechanical way to decide an important issue of policy under the antitrust laws."). 
89. See supra note 82 (citing cases relying on Armbrecht as basis for applying the Bailey 
doctrine to toll section 4B). 
90. Public Serv. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 315 F.2d 306, 310 n.6 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 
U.S. 809 (1963). 
91. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961-1968 (1988). 
92. Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., 483 U.S. 143, 150-56 (1987). 
93. The Agency Holding Court stated: 
Both RICO and the Clayton Act are designed to remedy economic injury by providing 
for the recovery of treble damages, costs, and attorney's fees. Both statutes bring to bear the 
pressure of "private attorneys general" on a serious national problem for which public 
prosecutorial resources are deemed inadequate; the mechanism chosen to reach the objective 
in both the Clayton Act and RICO is the carrot of treble damages. Moreover, both statutes 
aim to compensate the same type of injury; each requires that a plaintiff show injury "in his 
business or property by reason of" a violation. 
483 U.S. at 151; see also 113 CONG. REc. 18,007 (1967) (introducing S. 2048, 90th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1967), a forerunner to RICO as an addition to the Sherman Act instead of as an independ-
ent act); John L. Koenig, Comment, What They Have Done to Civil RICO: The Supreme Court 
Takes the Racketeering Requirement Out of Racketeering, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 821, 831 (1986) 
("[A] recurrent theme in RICO's legislative history is Congress' conscious adoption of antitrust 
enforcement mechanisms to fight organized criminal activity."). But see Paul B. O'Neill, Note, 
"Mother of Mercy, Is This the Beginning of RICO?'~· The Proper Point of Accrual of Private Civil 
RICO Actions, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 172, 183 (1990) ("[W]hile the Act relies heavily upon antitrust 
laws, Congress clearly intended RICO to be an original approach to a unique problem .... "); 
Agency Holding, 483 U.S. at 149 (noting similarity between RICO and civil rights statute). 
94. Riddell v. Riddell Washington Corp., 866 F.2d 1480, 1491-92 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
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held that the plaintiff could meet the concealment requirement by 
showing either affirmative acts of concealment or self-concealment. 
Moreover, every federal court that has considered the issue has ap-
plied the self-concealment standard to the RICO statute of 
limitation. 95 
In tolling the RICO limitation period, the courts have refused to 
do what several courts have done in the section 4B context: split the 
Bailey doctrine in two. The RICO courts' application of the Bailey 
doctrine properly follows the Supreme Court's language in Bailey, 
which set out the entire doctrine, and the language of Armbrecht, 
which expanded the entire doctrine, including the self-concealment 
standard, to all federal statutes of limitation. 
B. Legislative Intent 
The legislative history of the Clayton Act suggests Congress in-
tended to incorporate the fraudulent concealment doctrine, along with 
the self-concealment standard, into the section 4B statute of limita-
tion. During congressional debate over section 4B, the following dis-
cussion occurred on the House floor between Representative Patman 
and R~presentative Celler, the Chairman of the House Judiciary Com-
mittee and floor manager of the bill: 
Mr. Patman: Does that 4 year [statute of limitation] apply to conspiracy 
cases? Suppose there is a conspiracy, and it is 10 years before the con-
spiracy is known. 
Mr. Celler: In the case of conspiracy or fraud, the statute only runs from 
the time of discovery. 
Mr. Patman: From the time of the discovery? 
Mr. Celler: In conspiracy cases and cases of fraud. 96 
This exchange suggests that, despite the absolute language of section 
4B, Congress did not intend to create an absolute limitation period. 
However, the Congressmen did not define "conspiracy" or indicate 
exactly what conduct justified tolling until discovery. When read in 
light of the established law in 1955, this language supports the view 
that Congress intended to allow tolling under the self-concealment 
standard. 
When Congress enacted section 4B in 1955, Bailey and Armbrecht 
95. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Village oflsland Park, No. 89-2676, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9469, 
at *26-27 (E.D.N.Y. July 2, 1991) ("Concealment of the cause of action can be accomplished 
either by the defendant's contrivance to commit a wrong in such a manner as to conceal the very 
existence of a cause of action, or by actively misleading the plaintiff into the belief that he had no 
cause of action."); Companhia Sidergurgica Nacional v. D.B. Organ Co., No. 90-5661, 1991 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 6848, at •ts (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 1991) (applying the self-concealment standard); 
Snider v. Lone Star Art Trading Co., 672 F. Supp. 977, 984-85 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (citing Arm-
brecht and applying the self-concealment standard), ajfd., 838 F.2d 1215 (6th Cir. 1988); cf. 
O'Neill, supra note 93 (discussing the complexity of determining when a RICO cause of action 
accrues). 
96. 101 CONG. REC. 5129 (1955). 
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constituted the established law of fraudulent concealment. These two 
cases combined to import the fraudulent concealment doctrine - to-
gether with the self-concealment standard - into every federal statute 
of limitation.97 Courts may assume that Congress knew the law and 
enacted section 4B with the fraudulent concealment doctrine in 
mind.98 Absent an indication to the contrary, courts should presume 
that "Congress had actual knowledge of and affirmatively evinced a 
purpose of having the principle read into the statute."99 
More importantly, Congress appears to have had actual knowledge 
of the existing law and to have demonstrated an intention to continue 
it. The following exchange occurred immediately after Chairman Cel-
ler reassured Representative Patman that, in the case of conspiracy or 
fraud, the statute runs only from the time of discovery: 
Mr. Patman: And it is not the object or intention to change that at all? 
Mr. Celler: That is correct.100 
This discussion demonstrates that Congressmen Celler and Patman 
equated "change" with any provision that did not allow tolling in 
cases of conspiracy or fraud. Therefore, it must have been clear to 
Congress that the then-existing law provided such a tolling mecha-
nism, which Congress did not intend to alter. 101 
Opponents of applying the Bailey doctrine to section 4B discount 
these discussions as mere colloquy between two members of Congress 
who wanted to allow diligent plaintiffs to toll section 4B until they 
discovered the antitrust violation; as such, the discussions would de-
serve little weight in construing the statute.102 However, while a collo-
quy does not always serve as an accurate indicator of congressional 
intent, 103 it merits special weight when it represents the statements of 
97. See supra section II.A. 
98. Cf. Exploration Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 435, 449 (1918) (holding that because the 
Balley doctrine was the established law at the time, Congress enacted a statute of limitation with 
Bailey in mind); 2B NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CON-
STRUCTION, § 50.01 (5th ed. 1992) ("The antecedent common Jaw pertaining to the subject with 
which a statute deals comprises part of its legal history."). 
99. Kansas City, Mo. v. Federal Pacific Elec. Co., 310 F.2d 271, 277 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
371 U.S. 912 (1962), and cert. denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1963); see Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General 
Elec. Co., 312 F.2d 236, 241 (2d Cir. 1962) (en bane) ("[W]hen Congress enacted § 4B, it in-
tended that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment continue to apply as it had under Holmberg 
and its predecessors .... ") (emphasis added), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 909 (1963). 
100. 101 CONG. REc. 5129 (1955). 
101. See Recent Cases, Antitrust, supra note 78, at 1217 ("Celler merely stated that his Com-
mittee had no intention to change existing law .... "). 
102. See Atlantic City Elec. Co., 312 F.2d at 243 (Moore, J., dissenting) ("To say that a 
colloquy of two Congressmen known to be advocates of the rejected amendment establishes the 
intent of Congress is an unwarranted speculation .... "); Case Note, Antitrust, supra note 81, at 
820 (criticizing the "questionable use of the eleventh-hour colloquy on the floor of the House as a 
device for construing legislative intent"); Recent Cases, Antitrust, supra note 78, at 1217-18 
("Celler's statement should be given little, if any, weight to show an affirmative congressional 
intent that the Bailey doctrine be applied to section 4B."). 
103. 2A SINGER, supra note 98, at § 48.13. 
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a bill's sponsor or a member of the committee that considered the 
bill.104 
Opponents also discount these conversations because, in the six 
years prior to enacting section 4B, Congress considered and rejected 
several proposals that would have tolled the time period until discov-
ery, 105 and Congress rejected Representative Patman's attempts to add 
a discovery provision to section 4B in 1955.106 However, the following 
colloquy suggests that Congress never intended to eliminate tolling for 
conspiracy cases and had rejected the "discovery" provision because it 
was overinclusive: 
Mr. Celler: [If the discovery provision was enacted, we] practically 
[would] have no statute of limitations at all . ... We provide that the 4-
year statute [of limitations] shall start to run from the time of accrual of 
damages ... not from the time of discovery. 
Mr. Patman: Even in the case of fraud or conspiracy? 
Mr. Celler: No. In the case of fraud or conspiracy the s(atute of limita-
tion only runs from the time of discovery. 107 
As Chairman Celler emphasized, a general discovery provision differs 
from a fraudulent concealment provision. Under discovery provisions, 
plaintiffs can toll the statute of limitation until discovery by proving 
merely that they exercised due diligence.1os Under the fraudulent con-
cealment doctrine, in contrast, a plaintiff also must prove that the de-
fendant concealed the acts giving rise to the cause of action, either 
through affirmative concealment or by committing a wrong that inher-
ently conceals itself. 109 For example, a single firm's attempt to mo-
nopolize would not be a conspiracy, self-concealing or otherwise, that 
would trigger the fraudulent concealment doctrine in the absence of 
affirmative concealment. Such conduct would toll the cause of action 
104. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 395-97 (1950) (plural-
ity opinion) ("It is the sponsors that we look to when the meaning of the statutory words is in 
doubt."); Kansas City v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 310 F.2d 271, 280 (8th Cir.) ("Mr. Celler's 
remarks are clarifying additions that reflect the careful diligence of a congressman who virtually 
lived with the problem during the course of several congressional sessions."), cert. denied, 317 
U.S. 912 (1962) and cerL denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1963); 2A SINGER, supra note 98, at § 48.13. 
105. See, e.g., Kirkham, supra note 33, at 509-10; Opel, supra note 33, at 663, 665. Between 
1949 and 1955, Congress considered and rejected several bills that would have added a statute of 
limitation to the antitrust laws. Several of these bills contained provisions tolling the statute of 
limitation until discovery if the plaintiff exercised due diligence. For a more complete discussion 
of these bills and their legislative histories, see Note, Fraudulent Concealment and Section 4(b) of 
the Clayton Act, 49 VA. L. R.Ev. 277, 292-98 (1963) [hereinafter Note, Fraudulent Concealment 
and Section 4(b)]. 
106. 101 CoNG. R.Ec. 5129 (1955); Opel, supra note 33, at 665. 
107. 101 CONG. R.Ec. 5132-33 (1955) (emphasis added). 
108. Note, Tolling by Fraudulent Concealment, supra note 7, at 607-08. 
109. See Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 312 F.2d 236, 240 n.9 (2d Cir. 1962) 
("[A] provision tolling the statute of limitations until the time of discovery of a violation is not 
the same as the doctrine of fraudulent concealment, which involves elements beyond the injured 
party's failure to discover that a violation has taken place."), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 909 (1963); 
Marcus, supra note 21, at 870-74 (discussing the difference between a due diligence requirement 
and a concealment requirement). 
August 1993] Note - Concealment and the Clayton Act 2277 
under a discovery provision, however. Consequently, Congress' rejec-
tion of a discovery provision does not represent a rejection of the 
fraudulent concea1ment doctrine or the self-concea1ment standard.110 
The legislative history of section 4B provides some support for in-
cluding the self-concea1ment standard in the fraudulent concea1ment 
doctrine as applied to section 4B. Although Congress did not ex-
pressly include a tolling mechanism, it implicitly incorporated the 
fraudulent concea1ment doctrine with the self-concea1ment standard 
into section 4B. In doing so, Congress acted consistently with 
Supreme Court jurisprudence, which has never separated the self-con-
cealment standard from the fraudulent concea1ment doctrine. There-
fore, courts should apply the self-concea1ment standard to section 4B 
cases because it is most consistent with Congress' intent in passing 
section 4B and with the Supreme Court's treatment of the fraudulent 
concealment doctrine. 
III. THE BEST STANDARD 
An appropriate concea1ment standard should not only be consis-
tent with congressional intent and current jurisprudence, but also 
should help achieve the policy goals of the underlying statute. This 
Part considers how each of the three standards for the concealment 
element - separate-and-apart, affirmative acts, and self-concealment 
- meetS these objectives. Section III.A reviews the general policies 
behind statutes of limitation and argues that the self-concea1ment stan-
dard best furthers these policies. This section also responds to the crit-
icism that mere silence would be sufficient to toll the limitation period 
under a self-concea1ment standard. Section III.B examines the specific 
goals of section 4B - to create uniformity and certainty - and finds 
that the self-concealment standard best meets these goals. 
110. See Kansas City v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 310 F.2d 271, 278 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 371 
U.S. 912 (1962) and cert denied, 373 U.S. 914 (1963) ("[T]he legislative history of § 4B and 
particularly the proceedings which occurred on the floor of the House of Representatives prior to 
its passage, furnish[] convincing proof that Congress itself recognized the difference between 
failing to discover and fraudulent concealment."); Note, Fraudulent Concealment and Section 
4(b), supra note 105, at 300 ("[A]t least on a conceptual level, the discovery provision may be 
regarded as sufficiently distinct from the doctrine of fraudulent concealment to say that the rejec-
tion of this provision was not a rejection of the applicability of fraudulent concealment."); Recent 
Cases, Antitrust, supra note 78, at 1217: 
To the business interests represented in Congress, the Bailey doctri~e, placing upon a plain-
tiff the onerous burden of adducing proof of a self-concealing conspiracy or of affirmative 
acts of concealment in order to toll the statute of limitations, was less objectionable than a 
bill which did not clearly require proof of affirmative acts of concealment. 
Cf. Note, Tolling by Fraudulent Concealment, supra note 7, at 607-08 (highlighting the theoreti-
cal difference between fraudulent concealment and a discovery provision, but arguing that there 
is "little practical significance"); id. at 609 (acknowledging that even if there is no actual differ-
ence, Congress may have perceived one). 
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A. Policies Behind Statutes of Limitation 
At first glance, statutes of limitation may seem unfair: they deny a 
potential plaintiff the right to sue without any consideration of the 
merits of the claim. lll Nonetheless, "[s]tatutes of limitation form a 
part of the legislation of every government, and are necessary to the 
peace and repose of society."112 Legislatures enact statutes of limita-
tion in part to protect defendants from a plaintifrs fraudulent claims; 
the passage of time makes it difficult to distinguish between valid and 
invalid claims. 113 As time progresses, evidence vanishes, memories 
fade, and witnesses disappear, impairing the accuracy of factfinding. 114 
In short, statutes of limitation provide defendants with repose and 
protection against false claims. 
The policies in favor of protecting defendants must be balanced 
against plaintiffs' interest in obtaining judicial relief. 115 With this bal-
ance in mind, legislatures select an appropriate time limit for a given 
statute. 116 No matter how carefully legislatures balance these compet-
ing interests, any statute of limitation necessarily will cut off some le-
gitimate claims of honest plaintiffs and, at the same time, will allow 
some fraudulent claims to the detriment of innocent defendants. 117 
In order to minimize these inequities, courts toll statutes of limita-
tion under specific circumstances. Courts have developed several equi-
table tolling doctrines to account for situations where plaintiffs' rights 
to pursue meritorious claims outweigh defendants' rights to protection 
from stale claims.118 Tolling doctrines exist solely to complement lim-
itation periods. There is no independent basis for evaluating tolling 
standards; rather, courts must consider standards in light of the un-
derlying goals of statutes of limitation. 
The Supreme Court developed the doctrine of fraudulent conceal-
111. Kirkham, supra note 33, at 508. 
112. Stearns v. Page, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 819, 828 (1849). 
113. See Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 463-64 (1975). 
114. See Board of Regents of Univ. ofN.Y. v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980); United States 
v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979); Burnett v. New York Cent. R.R., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965). 
115. See Johnson, 421 U.S. at 454; Kirkham, supra note 33, at 508 ("[S]uch statutes seek to 
strike a balance between compensation to injured parties and the obligation to defend against 
stale claims .... "); O'Neill, supra note 93, at 190 (noting that statutes of limitation weigh 
policies of repose against plaintiffs' interest in judicial reliet). 
116. O'Neill, supra note 93, at 189 ("[T]he legislature or the court considers the interests of 
potential plaintiffs, potential defendants, and society at large."). In passing section 4B, Congress 
used the existing statutes of limitation in the states as guidance and determined that four years 
was a "fair and equitable" period of time. SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 2332. 
117. "Statutes of limitation" are by necessity "practical and pragmatic devices" that are "by 
definition arbitrary." Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 314 (1945). 
118. See Marcus, supra note 21, at 838 ("Tolling should be allowed, therefore, only when a 
sufficient showing is made to justify disregarding the policies underlying statutes of limita-
tions .... [C]ourts should strive to apply the fraudulent concealment doctrine consistently and to 
give effect to the policies underlying the statute of limitations."). 
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ment as a ground for tolling statutes of limitation in order to prevent 
defendants from fraudulently gaining protection from a statute oflimi-
tation.119 Moreover, where the defendant's concealment of the wrong 
has prevented the plaintiff from discovering it, the plaintiff has not sat 
on his rights, and the court should therefore not prevent him from 
pursuing meritorious claims. 
In choosing a concealment standard, courts should consider the 
same objectives that justify the judicially created fraudulent conceal-
ment doctrine. Because the self-concealment standard is the broadest 
of the three standards, it will preclude the fewest honest claims by 
meritorious plaintiffs.120 A plaintiff who has not discovered a self-con-
cealed wrong is equally deserving of judicial relief as one who has not 
discovered an affirmatively concealed wrong.121 
A stricter concealment standard thus is appropriate only if plain-
tiffs' interests outweigh the other half of the balance - the defendants' 
need for protection from false claims supported by stale evidence. It is 
true that the self-concealment standard will expose defendants to more 
dishonest claims. However, as noted in Bailey, if the defendant con-
ceals his wrong he does not merit protection from these claims.122 A 
defendant who commits a self-concealing wrong deserves no more pro-
tection from stale claims than a defendant who actively conceals a 
wrong.123 Any standard other than the self-concealment standard 
119. Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 349 (1875); see also Gius v. Brooklyn E. Dist. 
Terminal, 359 U.S. 231, 232 (1959) ("To decide this case we need look no further than the 
maxim that no man may take advantage of his own wrong."); Marcus, supra note 21, at 872 ("It 
is inequitable to allow a defendant who has concealed his wrong to profit from his 
concealment."). 
120. Under the self-concealment standard, the plaintiff can prove either that the defendant 
concealed the cause of action or that the defendant's conduct concealed itself. Thus, any cause of 
action that can be tolled under either of the other standards necessarily can be tolled under the 
self-concealment standard. 
121. Cf Marcus, supra note 21, at 866 ("It is certainly odd that the victim of a nationwide 
price-fixing conspiracy that is inherently self-concealing must prove affirmative concealment to 
justify his delay in suing when a plaintiff alleging securities fraud against a defendant with whom 
he dealt personally is relieved of that burden."). 
122. See 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) at 349. This is the rationale underlying the entire fraudulent 
concealment doctrine. 
123. See Horton, supra note 15, at 799-800 ("Defendants who engage in widespread conspir-
acies often do not have to destroy evidence, falsify documents, or utilize other techniques that 
would constitute affirmative acts of concealment in order to avoid detection of the conspiracy."). 
The defendant's need for protection will be the same in either case because the evidence 
needed to prove the underlying violation will be equally stale for a self-concealing violation as it 
will be for a violation concealed after the fact. Arguably, the choice of a standard will affect the 
age of the evidence required to prove the concealment. Under the self-concealing and affirmative 
acts standards, the evidence of concealment will be as old as the underlying violation; under the 
separate-and-apart standard, the concealing act necessarily occurred after the underlying viola-
tion. However, this problem is trivial because, in most cases, the separate concealing act occurs 
only shortly after the conspiracy. For a possible solution to this problem, see Colorado v. West-
ern Paving, 833 F.2d 867, 879 (10th Cir. 1987), withdrawn, 841 F.2d 1025 (10th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988), which endorses a clear and convincing evidence standard for prov-
ing self-concealing conspiracies. 
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would provide different protectfon based on the type of concealment. 
For example, the affirmative acts standard rewards defendants for en-
gineering wrongs that successfully conceal themselves instead of ones 
requiring affirmative concealment.124 The policies behind statutes of 
limitation do not support such a distinction. 
Opponents of the self-concealment standard argue that the stan-
dard will render the statute of limitation useless because a plaintiff can 
toll the time limitation by showing that the defendant remained silent 
or merely denied involvement in the scheme.125 This criticism demon-
strates the existence of some common misconceptions about the self-
concealment standard. First, adopting a self-concealment standard is 
not equivalent to adopting a discovery provision. Under the self-con-
cealment standard, courts will toll undiscovered antitrust causes of ac-
tion only if the defendant commits affirmative acts of concealment or 
if concealment represents a necessary part of the wrong. For example, 
if a plaintiff claims that the defendant violated the Sherman Act by 
attempting to monopolize, the plaintiff has not alleged that the defend-
ant committed an inherently self-concealing wrong; therefore, such a 
plaintiff must prove affirmative acts of concealment to toll section 
4B.126 
Second, tolling under the self-concealment standard is not 
equivalent to tolling because of the defendant's silence. In Wood v. 
Carpenter, 127 a case applying the fraudulent concealment doctrine to a 
cause of action grounded in fraud, the Supreme Court held that 
"[c]oncealment by mere silence is not enough. There must be some 
trick or contrivance intended to exclude suspicion and prevent in-
quiry."128 The Sixth Circuit apparently has interpreted this language 
to mandate an affirmative acts standard. In 1988, the court held: "We 
have previously indicated that concealment necessitates the commis-
sion of affirmative acts. Mere silence, where there is no duty to speak, 
does not toll the statute."129 The prohibition against proving conceal-
ment by mere silence does not provide support for the affirmative acts 
124. See Saveri & Saveri, supra note 4, at 644-45 ("Case law has long recognized that a 
wrongdoer who successfully conceals an antitrust claim should not be permitted to use the shield 
of the statute of limitations to bar redress by those whom he has victimized."). 
125. See, e.g., Pinney Dock & Transp. Co. v. Pennsylvania Cent. Corp., 838 F.2d 1445, 
1466-72 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 880°(1988). 
126. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text (discussing the difference between the 
self-concealment standard and a general discovery provision). 
127. 101 U.S. 135 (1879). 
128. 101 U.S. at 143. 
129. Pinney Dock, 838 F.2d at 1471. The court reiterated this idea, stating: 
Mere silence, or one's unwillingness to divulge one's allegedly wrongful activities, is not 
sufficient. As the underlying cause of action here is based upon alleged antitrust violations 
not fraud, we agree ..• that a plaintiff should be required to prove affirmative acts of con-
cealment, particularly in light of the strong policy in favor of statutes of limitations. 
838 F.2d at 1472 (discussing Gaetzi v. Carling Brewing Co., 205 F. Supp 615 (E.D. Mich. 1962)). 
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standard. No court applying the self-concealment standard has ever 
stated that silence by itself served to toll the statute of limitation.130 
Moreover, Wood v. Carpenter involved an underlying claim of fraud, 
for which it long has been settled that affirmative acts are not neces-
sary.131 Wood v. Carpenter merely reinforces the fact that courts can-
not equate silence with self-concealment. 
B. Uniformity, Administrative Efficiency, and Section 4B 
A concealment standard should not only further the general poli-
cies behind statutes of limitation, but also the specific policies of sec-
tion 4B. In enacting section 4B Congress intended to eliminate 
confusion, improve fairness, and reduce forum shopping by creating a 
uniform statute of limitation.132 Choosing and applying a uniform 
standard will help achieve these objectives.133 This section examines 
the three standards and concludes that the self-concealment standard 
will further these policies, while the affirmative acts standard and the 
separate-and-apart standard will continue to create uncertainty and 
confusion. 
I. The Affirmative Acts Standard 
Under the affirmative acts standard, the plaintiff can meet the con-
cealment requirement by showing that the defendant committed af-
firmative acts of concealment, even if the defendant did so as part of 
the underlying violation.134 While this standard appears simple on its 
face, it has created confusion as to what conduct satisfies the conceal-
ment requirement. . 
The Tenth Circuit's opinion in King & King Enterprises v. 
Champlin Petroleum Corp., 135 a private price-fixing suit, illustrates the 
confusion created by the standard. The court began its discussion of 
the concealment requirement by quoting with approval a passage stat-
ing that the plaintiff need not show. affirmative acts of concealment if 
the defendant's actions were inherently self-concealing.136 However, 
the Tenth Circuit then noted that the plaintiff must prove "some af-
130. However, one co=entator has noted that, even under the affirmative acts standard, a 
plaintiff' faces a minimal burden. Marcus, supra note 21, at 858-61. 
131. Even the Sixth Circuit, which equated self-concealment with mere silence, recognized 
this fact. Pinney Dock. 838 F.2d at 1470 (" '[A]ffirmative acts of concealment must be shown 
except in cases founded on fraud or breach of fiduciary duty.' ") (quoting Gaetzi, 205 F. Supp. at 
621). 
132. SENATE REPORT, supra note 7, at 2331. 
133. See Marcus, supra note 21, at 855 ("[T]he application of these superficially simple con-
cepts has left some courts groping with seemingly contradictory rules and empty concepts."). 
134. See supra section I.C.2. 
135. 657 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982). 
136. "[P]laintiff' 'would have to establish either that the defendant fraudulently concealed the 
conduct forming the basis of the claim or that the defendant's conduct by reason of its fraudulent 
nature was inherently self-concealing.'" King & King, 657 F.2d at 1154 (quoting Ashland Oil 
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firmative act of fraudulent concealment" to meet the concealment re-
quirement.137 The King & King standard created so much confusion 
that different courts have cited the case for opposite propositions. 138 
Although the King & King court adopted the affirmative acts stan-
dard, the court's threshold for affirmative acts was so low as to render 
the requirement virtually meaningless. The plaintiff in King & King 
showed that the defendants committed two affirmative acts in conceal-
ing their price-fixing conspiracy: (1) they created a phone list with two 
columns to separate those people in on the conspiracy from those who 
were not; and (2) they made their price-fixing-related phone calls after 
regular business hours. Based on this evidence, the court held that as 
a matter of law the defendants' conduct represented affirmative acts of 
concealment.139 Although the court applied the affirmative acts stan-
dard, it is hard to imagine any acts within a conspiracy that would not 
meet this low standard. 140 
Such a loose definition of affirmative acts is not unique to the 
Tenth Circuit. Other courts have found that the submission of a non-
collusion affidavit, 141 agreements to give false grand jury testimony, 142 
and denial of wrongdoing143 could constitute affirmative acts of con-
cealment. With such a loose definition of affirmative acts, no defend-
ant could engage in a bid-rigging conspiracy without some 
"affirmative" act of concealment. Despite the courts' language to the 
contrary, the affirmative act standard as applied in many cases is virtu-
ally indistinguishable from the self-concealment standard. 144 
Co. v. Union Oil Co., 567 F.2d 984, 988 (Temp. Erner. Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 994 
(1978)). 
137. King & King, 657 F.2d at 1155. 
138. Compare Snider v. Lone Star Art Trading Co., 672 F. Supp 977, 984 (E.D. Mich. 1987) 
(citing King & King, 657 F.2d at 1154 in support of the self-concealment standard), ajfd., 838 
F.2d 1215 (6th Cir. 1988) and Edwin S. Hackenberg, Comment, All the Myriad Ways: Accrual of 
Civil RICO Claims in the Wake of Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff, 48 LA. L. REV. 1411, 
1419 n.41 (citing King & King as an example of a court applying the self-concealment standard) 
with Colorado v. Western Paving Constr. Co., 630 F. Supp. 206, 209 n.3 (D. Colo. 1986) (citing 
King & King in support of the affirmative acts standard) and with Colorado v. Western Paving 
Constr. Co., 833 F.2d 867, 877 (10th Cir. 1987) (saying that King & King never explicitly ad-
dre!>sed the self-concealing conspiracy argument). 
139. King & King, 657 F.2d at 1155. 
140. See Saveri & Saveri, supra note 4, at 641-42 ("The very nature of a price fixing conspir-
acy precludes the victims from being privy to any meetings, telephone calls, correspondence, or 
other communications between members of the conspiracy."). 
141. Texas v. Allan Construction, 851 F.2d 1526, 1532-33 (5th Cir. 1988). 
142. New York v. Hendrickson Bros., Inc., 840 F.2d 1065, 1084 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 
U.S. 848 (1988). Although the court held that the self-concealing conspiracy applied to section 
4B cases, it also found that the defendants' actions would have met the affirmative acts standard 
if the court had applied it. However, unlike the Fifth Circuit in Allan Construction, the Second 
Circuit implied that the submission of noncollusion affidavits would not be sufficient to meet the 
affirmative acts standard. See Hendrickson Bros., 840 F.2d at 1085. 
143. See Rutledge v. Boston Woven Hose & Rubber Co., 576 F.2d 248, 250 (9th Cir. 1978); 
Philco v. Radio Corp. of Am., 186 F. Supp. 155, 163-64 (E.D. Pa. 1960) (dicta). 
144. See Marcus, supra note 21, at 860 ("Even decisions premised on affirmative acts of 
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Although these criticisms address specific applications of the af-
firmative acts standard, they reveal an underlying problem with the 
standard itself. The standard requires courts to draw a line between 
affirmative concealment and self-concealment, yet no court has 
demonstrated an ability to do so in a consistent manner. 
2. The Separate-and-Apart Standard 
The separate-and-apart standard avoids this specific line-drawing 
problem by excluding all acts that are part of the conspiracy .145 This 
solution simply changes the nature of the line-drawing problem, how-
ever; instead of determining which acts are "affirmative," the court 
must decide which acts constitute part of the underlying 
conspiracy.146 
Courts have distinguished acts as separate and apart by determin-
ing whether the acts are "in furtherance" of the underlying conspir-
acy.147 Conspirators, however, necessarily must keep the conspiracy 
secret to be successful; thus, "every act of concealment furthers the 
success of the offense by stalling its detection."148 Consequently, "the 
standard becomes a subjective judicial judgment that does little to pro-
mote certainty."149 
In an alternative approach, judges distinguish acts based not on 
their role in the scheme, but on whether they occur subsequent in time 
to the underlying violation.150 The ongoing nature of the typical anti-
trust conspiracy renders this distinction inconsequential, however. 151 
In addition, this approach will lead to arbitrary results: an act done 
one day after the end of conspiracy will toll the statute of limitation, 
while the same act done one day before the conspiracy ends will 
not.152 
concealment suggest that, as a practical matter, the concealment prong is no longer an independ-
ent requirement."). 
145. See supra section I.C.1. 
146. See Marcus, supra note 21, at 860 ("[C)onduct [worthy of tolling the statute of limita-
tion] is not easily separated, chronologically or otherwise, from the conduct that underlies the 
claim."). 
147. Texas v. Allan Constr. Co., 851 F.2d 1526, 1527 (5th Cir. 1988). 
148. Allan Constr., 851 F.2d at 1532 (5th Cir. 1988); Marcus, supra note 21, at 859 (noting 
that price-fixing conspiracies must be kept secret to be successful); Opel, supra note 33, at 657 
("[I)t is often very hard for a plaintiff to label a defendant's acts of concealment as 'separate and 
apart' because these acts are often closely intertwined with the conspiracy that constitutes the 
violation."); see also Saveri & Saveri, supra note 4, at 641 ("[A]s a practical matter, no conspiracy 
would proceed uninterrupted for very long if the victims of the conspiracy knew of its 
existence."). 
149. Opel, supra note 33, at 657. 
150. See, e.g., Stanley v. Stanton, 36 Ind. 445 (1871) (requiring that the concealment occur 
after the wrong). 
151. See Marcus, supra note 21, at 858. 
152. See Allan Constr., 851 F.2d at 1532 (citing this rationale for not applying the separate-
and-apart standard). 
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Both formulations of the separate-and-apart standard shift, but do 
not resolve, the affirmative acts line-drawing problem. Consequently, 
even if all the courts adopt this standard, their varying application of 
the standard will subvert the goals of uniformity and certainty. 
3. The Self-Concealment Standard 
By avoiding awkward line drawing, the self-concealment standard 
will promote uniform and predictable results. As with any standard, 
of course, courts must draw some line. In this case, a court must de-
termine whether the wrong - as committed by the defendant - was 
self-concealing. Unlike the other standards, the self-concealment stan-
dard focuses on the nature of the conspiracy, not on specific acts com-
mitted by the defendant. This makes line drawing less arbitrary. For 
example, a single firm attempting to monopolize ordinarily will not 
commit a self-concealing antitrust violation. As with the theft of an 
antique vase, the defendant can be successful without concealing the 
wrong. Thus, in such cases, the plaintiff should have to prove affirma-
tive acts of concealment to meet the concealment requirement. 153 In 
contrast, a bid-rigging conspiracy is inherently self-concealing. Like 
the seller of the sham vase, a conspirator must maintain the secrecy of 
a bid-rigging scheme in order to attempt to rig a bid.154 Thus, the 
plaintiff need not prove the existence of an affirmative act. 
The self-concealment standard best furthers the underlying objec-
tives of section 4B. Both the separate-and-apart standard and the af-
firmative acts standard require courts to draw uncertain and wavering 
lines. This unpredictable line drawing leads to the very results Con-
gress intended to avoid in passing section 4B - confusion and uncer-
tainty. On the other hand, the self-concealment standard allows 
courts to look consistently at the underlying nature of the wrong with-
out distinguishing between types of acts of concealment. 
CONCLUSION 
In applying the fraudulent concealment doctrine to section 4B of 
the Clayton Act, the courts of appeals have adopted three different 
standards for the concealment requirement - the separate-and-apart 
standard, the affirmative acts standard, and the self-concealment stan-
dard. The proliferation of standards has defeated the primary goal of 
section 4B - to create a uniform and certain limitation period for all 
153. In determining whether affirmative acts are present, a court can avoid the awkward line· 
drawing problem otherwise present under the affirmative acts standard. Here, the court need not 
distinguish between self-concealing acts and affirmative acts of concealment. 
154. See New York v. Hendrickson Bros., Inc., 840 F.2d 1065, 1083 (2d Cir.) (noting the 
self-concealing nature of a bid-rigging scheme and citing Colorado v. Western Paving Constr. 
Co., 833 F.2d 867 (10th Cir. 1987), withdrawn, 841 F.2d 1025 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 
870 (1988)), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 848 (1988). 
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antitrust violations. To rectify this situation, the courts should adopt 
a single standard: the self-concealment standard. The self-conceal-
ment standard constitutes a vital part of the Supreme Court's fraudu-
lent concealment jurisprudence, and courts err when they apply the 
fraudulent concealment doctrine without the self-concealment stan-
dard. In addition, the self-concealment standard furthers Congress' 
intentions in passing section 4B and best meets the underlying goals of 
statutes of limitation. Finally, the self-concealment standard relieves 
courts from the impossible task of distinguishing between the acts 
comprising the conspiracy and those intended to prevent its detection. 
Consequently, courts can apply the standard uniformly and consist-
ently, leading to fair and predictable results. 
